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ABSTRACT. Rare earth elements (REE) contain unique chemical and physical
properties such as lanthanum, are found in small concentrations, need extensive
precise processes to separate, and are critical components of modern technologies
such as laser guidance systems, personal electronics such as IPhones, satellites, and
military weapons systems as varied as Virginia-class fast attack submarines, DDG51 Aegis destroyers, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and precision guided munitions.
The U.S. has some rare earth resources, but is heavily dependent on access to them
from countries as varied as Afghanistan, Bolivia, and China. Losing access to these
resources would have significant adverse economic, military, and political implications for the U.S. and its allies if their supply sources are restricted or eliminated.
This article will examine the critical strategic importance of these resources, the
historical origins and contemporary development of U.S. policy toward strategic
minerals, and how multiple U.S. Government agencies are involved in this emerging
policymaking arena. It features significant use of U.S. and foreign government
statistics and analyses and scholarly journal literature. It will conclude by suggesting
efforts to limit the severity of this problem to the U.S.’ economy and national security
interests.
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Introduction
Multiple factors influence the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign
and national security policy. Besides the numerous economic, political, and
psychological factors in such policymaking, the role of accessing and having
dependable supplies to natural resources plays a paramount role. Most observers of international relations and security are familiar with the importance
of oil and natural gas in these areas. More attention, however, needs to be
devoted to the role played by other natural resources, including minerals, in
U.S. foreign and national security policies. The role of Rare Earth Elements
(REEs) is of particular importance due to the weakness of the U.S.’ domestic
REE industry and its dependence on foreign suppliers, particularly China,
for its access to these materials which have become deeply interwoven into
the U.S.’ civilian economy and to its national security infrastructure. Failure
by the U.S. to expand the growth of its REE industry could make it economically and militarily vulnerable to supply disruptions from China and other
foreign suppliers who are antagonistic to U.S. economic and strategic interests.1
What Are Rare Earth Elements?
REE are 15 elements ranging from atomic number 57 (Lanthanum) to 71
(Lutetium) on the periodic table of elements. In addition, atomic number 39
(Yttrium) and atomic number 21 (Scandium) are also regarded as REEs
because of similar chemical and physical properties. Light REEs cover from
Lanthum to atomic number 64 (Gadolinium) and heavy REEs cover from
atomic number 65 (Terbium) to Lutetium. REEs are not defined as rare due
to supply shortages, but due to their identification during the 18 th and 19th
centuries as being materials which could not be changed further by heat
unlike lime or magnesia. Atomic number 58 (Cerium) is the most abundant
REE and is more common in the Earth’s crust than copper or lead and all
REEs, except Atomic number 61 (Promethium) are most abundant on average
in the earth’s crust than silver, gold, or platinum.
Concentrated and economically minable deposits of REEs are unusual.2
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Figure 1 Rare Earth Elements

Source: U.S. Geological Survey

U.S. and International Civilian Uses of REEs
REEs are significantly integrated into a multiplicity of civilian applications
in the U.S. and internationally. They make phosphors (substances emitting
luminescence) for ray tubes and flat screen displays ranging in size from smart
phone displays to stadium scoreboards with some REEs used in fluorescent
and LED lighting. The glass industry is the largest single consumer of REE
raw materials using them for glass polishing and additives providing color
and special optical properties. Lanthanum consists of nearly 50% of digital
camera lenses including cell phone cameras. Catalysts of this element are
also used to refine petroleum and cerium-based catalysts are used in automobile catalytic converters.3
Magnets deploying REEs are receiving frequent use with neodymiumiron-boron magnets being the strongest known magnets and are very useful
when space and weight are limiting factors. REE magnets are used in computer hard disks and CD-ROM and DVD disk drives. Disk drive spindles
attain high stability in their spinning motion when driven by a REE magnet.
Such magnets are also used in multiple conventional auto subsystems
including power steering, electric windows, power seats, and audio speakers.
Nickel-metal hydrides are built with lanthanum-based alloys as anodes and
can be used as batteries in hybrid electric cars requiring 10–15 kilograms per
vehicle. Other REEs, including cerium, lanthanum, neodymium, and praseodymium, commonly used as a mixed oxide called mischmetal, are used in
steel making to remove impurities and in producing special alloys.4
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Global Dispersion of REEs
Global REE resources are distributed throughout the world with only a small
percentage being available in the U.S. A 2008 National Research Council
report stressed that REEs rank high on the “criticality” factor of raw materials
emphasizing they possess high technological and economic importance along
with high supply side risk. This assessment went on to maintain that critical
material availability can and will change as production technologies evolve
and new products are developed, that the U.S. Government defines a critical
mineral as one with essential uses and subject to supply restriction risk, the
longer it takes to substitute a mineral increases cost and expense and increases the impact of mineral supply disruption, significant short and mediumterm mineral supply disruptions may occur due to significant demand increase,
thin markets, product concentration, production predominantly as a byproduct, and lack of available old-scrap for recycling or the infrastructure
required for recycling, long-term mineral and mineral product availability
requires continued minerals education spending, and that import dependence
alone is not a useful risk indicator but imports can be vulnerable to disruption
if supply is concentrated in one or more REE exporting countries with high
political risk or where significantly increasing internal demand may cause
indigenous REE production to be directed to internal consumption.5
The following section will describe the REE resources, industries, and
governmental policymaking of selected countries besides the U.S. which
begins with charts showing global REE distribution.
Figure 2 Global Map of REE Dispersion

Source: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
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Figure 3 Global Mine Production of Rare Earth Minerals in Different Countries

Source: Hydrometallurgy 165 (October 2016): 6.

Afghanistan – The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that Afghanistan’s Helmand Province contains REEs and uranium with these concentrated
in the Khan Neshin carbonite complex uncovered by Soviet investigators in
the 1970s and confirmed by subsequent Afghan and USGS geological
investigations. Their estimate of undiscovered REE deposits include a mean
expected value of 1.4 million metric tons of REE and 3.48 million metric
tons of niobium which, while not a REE, is considered a critical strategic
material due to its use in various superconducting purposes including electronics, nuclear industries, and optics. Afghanistan has been unable to achieve
significant development of its REE industry due to violent conditions and
lack of infrastructure including electricity, mining and mineral processing
facilities, and roads. However, these factors have not unduly restricted China’s
interests in Afghan REE reserves and efforts to gain influence in accessing
them. 6
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Figure 4 LANDSAT Imagery of Helmand REE and Khanneshin Site

Source: USGS

Figure 5 Khanneshin Photos

Source: USGS
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Helmand Province has seen repeated fighting between the U.S., international
coalition allies, and the Afghanistan Government against the Taliban.
Operation Moshtarak lasting over several months in 2010 resulted in an
eventual military victory for the U.S. and its allies. The June 2017 edition of
the Defense Department’s report Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan documented ongoing military operations in Helmand and Kandahar
provinces including the Taliban claiming responsibility for fatal January 10,
2017 attacks in these provinces, ongoing Taliban efforts to contest and seize
population and communication centers in these regions persist, and three U.S.
military personnel were wounded during a March 20, 2017 insider attack at a
Helmand Province military base.7
Figure 6 Map of Southwest Afghanistan including Helmand Province

Source: Institute for the Study of War
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Australia – Mineral resources have played and continuing playing critically
important roles in Australian economic prosperity and strategic interests. 8
During 2015, Australian mineral exports (except petroleum products) were
AUS $141 billion representing 56% of export merchandise, 45% of exported
goods and services, and nearly 9% of Gross Domestic Product. 2015 Australian REE resources are estimated to be 3.44 million metric tons (MT) up
from 3.19 million MT in 2013. This represents approximately 2.6% of the
world’s estimated total of 130 MT. Growth in Australian REE stem from
resource upgrades at Yangibana (Hastings Technology Metals Ltd) and
Browns Range (Northern Minerals Ltd) in Western Australia and Nolans Bore
(Arafura Resources Ltd) in the Northern Territory. Lynas Corporation Ltd
operates Australia’s only rare earths mine at Mount Weld, Western Australia
which supplies Rare Earth concentrates to the Lynas Advanced Materials Plant
(LAMP) in Malaysia. Mount Weld produces on a LAMP demand basis and
in 2015 produced 10,900 tons of ready-for-sale RE oxides making Australia
second only to China which generates 85% of this production.9
Figure 7 Australian REE Locations

Source: Geosciences Australia
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In 2011, Australia and the U.S. signed a Reciprocal Security of Supply
Agreement to ensure that each country provided the other a reciprocal
priority and supply of defense products, materials, and services to discharge
their military commitments according to their foreign and security policy
requirements.10
Canada – Canada’s geographic and geological expanses also feature potentially substantive REE reserves and Canada has a demonstrated a successful
historical and contemporary record of mineral resources extraction. It has been
estimated that there are over 200 individual REE demonstration projects at
various stages of development in Canada with the following chart demonstrating potential future REE mines:
Figure 8 Rare Earth Projects (Potential Future Mines)

Source: Natural Resources Canada, brief presented to the Committee, 25 November 2013

Canadian Government officials have identified 11 REE projects in advanced
exploration stage which are all Canadian owned. The capital expenditure
requirements of developing a Canadian rare earth mine are estimated to range
from $CAN 106 million–$2.5 billion which are much higher than mining
traditional metals like copper. The House of Commons Natural Resources
Committee learned that developing a Canadian REE mine could take between
7–10 years involving multiple development stages including prefeasibility
studies and environmental assessment with the following chart reflect the
multifaceted permitting process.11
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Figure 9 Front-End REE Supply Chain

Source: Natural Resources Canada, brief presented to the Committee, 25 November 2013, and
the Canadian Rare Earth Elements Network, brief presented to the Committee, 13 February
2014

The Canadian Government has pledged to promote research on environmentally cleaner and more efficient REE and chromite extraction. Ottawa
maintains that REEs are key components facilitating a transition to clean
technologies behind a transition to a low carbon economy. Such programs
are believed to deliver process efficiencies; economic and market analyses to
inform technology gaps; laboratory and pilot-scale testing facilities; and highly
qualified personnel to position Canada to develop a strategic market for
REEs. Additional outputs of REE related spending are projected to include
developing and demonstrating technologies to increase mining operational
productivity, including techniques to break rocks without explosives in order
to save time and money; engineering rock bolts (for stabilizing rock excavations) with sensors to monitor rock bolt integrity; and advancing development
of a facility to cost-effectively test ground support systems. 12
Testifying before the House of Commons Natural Resource Committee
on February 25, 2014, Pierre Neatby, Vice-President of Avalon Rare Metals,
stressed Canada’s political and economic stability and mining engineering
excellence as giving Ottawa the opportunity to become a reliable alternative
REE supplier:
Canada has a history of mining excellence and companies that are
looking for rare-earth products outside of China are looking for a
culturally, politically stable country to invest in, and Canada fits
that description. Some of the other projects that we’re competing
against, whether they be in South Africa, Kyrgyzstan…. Those
countries may not be seen as being as politically stable as a Canada,
or a U.S., or an Australia. So having the Canadian government make
a signal to these potential investors that Canada is supportive of rare
earths would help us tremendously in attracting that investment.13

China – China is the world’s preeminent producer, consumer, and exporter
of REE’s and has demonstrated the willingness to use its geopolitical
leverage in this arena to seek to achieve economic and strategic objectives.
Beijing possesses almost 95% of global REE reserves. At the end of 2014,
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21 mining companies and over 100 processing companies were registered
with Beijing’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology for a cumulative total rare-earth mining capacity of 300,000 tons annually and an annual
rare-earth production capacity of 60,000 tons annually. Additional secondary
rare-earth products are also produced from waste materials by some recycling
companies.
January 2014 saw China’s State Council approve a rare-earth industry integration plan prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other agencies to consolidate six large rare-earth companies and
improve the industry’s international competitiveness. These six companies
are:
Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd.
(CHINALCO)
Baogang Group

Integrates REE companies in Guangxi,
Jiangsu, Shandong, and Sichuan.
Integrates REE companies in Gansu
and Inner Mongolia.
Integrates REE companies in Hunan
plus companies it has in Fujian,
Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Yunnan.
Integrates REE companies in Jianxi.
Integrates REE companies in
Guangdong.
Integrates REE companies in Fujian.14

China Minmetals Corporation

Ganzhou Mining Group
Guangdong Rising Nonferrous Group
Xiamen Tungsten Group

Figure 10 Chinese Geographic Distribution of REE Resources

Source: MIT
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China’s REE Geopolitical Leverage
China’s essentially monopolistic control of global REE reserves and its
extensive exports of these resources have caused concerns that it might use
this preeminent position to engage in geopolitical leverage against the U.S.
and other REE importing countries to achieve geopolitical and strategic
objectives detrimental to the importing countries. Chinese preeminence in
the global REE market has occurred since the mid-1980s due to China’s
economic growth which has exponentially increased its appetite for REE’s, a
declining U.S. REE industry due to higher labor costs compared with China,
environmental problems at the U.S. Mountain Pass Mine in California which
resulted in this mine being temporarily shut down as a result of stringent
U.S. regulatory and environmental laws, and lower Chinese labor costs and
environmental standards.15
An analysis of a how a potential 2030 confrontation between the U.S. and
its allies against China over Taiwan and the South China Sea could injure U.S.
and allied access to REEs is described as follows:
The numerous weapons systems that rely on rare earths technology
place the United States at a strategic disadvantage with regards to
China. If a prolonged large-scale conflict between the two conflicts
broke out over a Taiwan Strait or South China Sea dispute, the
United States may find itself squeezed to obtain sufficient supplies
of rare earths to manufacture replacement parts or systems to remain
engaged in the fight. Much as the lack of secure access to oil was
crippling to the Germans at the end of World War II, rare earths
could play a similar, pivotal role in a future conflict with China.
In the air-to-air arena alone, the requirement to replace expended
stockpiles of advanced air-to-air missiles could become a factor
very quickly based on the number of aircraft China would be
capable of employing.16

In July 2010, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced a 725% reduction
in Rare Earth Oxide exports for the second half of that year limiting annual
REE exports to 30,258 tons. In December 2010, Beijing announced that its
REE export quotas for the first half of 2011 would be 14,508 tons or an 11%
reduction. China also demonstrated its intention to use REEs as geopolitical
leverage when a Japanese Coast Guard vessel attempted to stop a Chinese
fishing boat from illegally fishing in Japanese waters in the East China Sea
with the Japanese ship ramming the Chinese vessel and apprehending its
captain. An ensuing political split resulted in suspension of high-level contacts between Beijing and Tokyo and China temporarily withholding REE
exports to Japan.17
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World Trade Organization Ruling and U.S. Expressions of Concern
Many U.S. Government and other sources have expressed concern about
China’s REE export quotas and monopolistic dominance of the global REE
market. On March 13, 2012, the U.S. requested consultations with China on
Beijing’s REE restrictions. Then U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk maintained “America’s workers and manufacturers are being hurt in both established and budding industrial sectors by these policies. China continues to
make its export restraints more restrictive, resulting in massive distortions
and harmful disruptions in supply chains for these materials throughout the
global marketplace.”18 On March 22, 2012, the European Union and Japan
requested the World Trade Organization (WTO) to join this forum’s consultation on these export quotas with Canada requesting to join these consultations on March 26, 2012. China allowed these countries to participate in
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) process with the U.S. requesting that a DSB be established on June 27, 2012. A DSB was established by
the WTO later in 2012 with countries as varied as Australia, Brazil, India,
Japan, and Saudi Arabia participating.19
Following over two years of deliberations, the WTO ruled on August 29,
2014, that China’s export duties on rare earths, tungsten, and molybdenum
were inconsistent with its accession to the WTO, that these duties were inconsistent with Article 11 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) prohibiting trade restrictions besides duties, taxes, and other charges,
and that Chinese restrictions on the trading rights of REE and molybdenum
exporting companies were inconsistent with justificatory arguments expressed
by China in its position paper on this dispute.20
China eliminated the REE export duties in January 2015 replacing them
with a resources tax. This tax was announced by China’s Ministry of Finance
and State Administration of Taxation on April 30, 2015, setting the following
levels for these categories of REEs, tungsten and molybdenum:
Light Rare Earth 11.5% in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, 9.5% in Sichuan
Province, 7.5% in Shandong Province
Middle and Heavy Rare Earth 27%
Tungsten 6.5%
Molybdenum 11%.21

U.S. concern over Chinese REE monopoly has been expressed in numerous
venues. A 2014 article in Joint Force Quarterly described how Afghanistan’s
need for money could allow it to be drawn into China’s geopolitical orbit as
Beijing seeks to enhance its influence over Kabul’s REE reserves.22 A 2010
article in this same Defense Department journal, published before the temporary Chinese ban on REE exports to Japan, reported that an online Chinese
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Communist Party newspaper and several Chinese blogs encouraged banning
the sale of REEs to U.S. companies following the Obama Administration
approving a $6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan. This article contended that
China has been looking at possible military applications of REEs since the
1960s, that Beijing has engaged in some REE research collaboration with
Iran and North Korea, and that Beijing’s REE reserves, research activities,
and capabilities could potentially give it a decisive edge in military technologies in comparison with the U.S.23
A 2016 report by the Obama Administration’s National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC) acknowledged that REEs and related materials
including platinum-group metals, antimony, vanadium, tungsten, and germanium consistently fell into the category of strategically critical materials.
However, it sidestepped the national security implications of U.S. dependence
on unstable and potentially hostile foreign suppliers with the following
bureaucratic rhetorical obfuscation:
For minerals ultimately identified as critical, it is fair to wonder
what can be done to decrease the associated risks and vulnerabilities. As illustrated by Ku and Hung, there is a hierarchy of
strategies that can be adopted to help reduce mineral supply risks.
These strategies range from short-term efforts aimed at developing
strategic inventories and implementing fixed-price contracts, to
medium-term efforts such as improving efficiencies by reducing
waste and increasing recovery rates throughout the life cycle, to
longer-term efforts that include material redesign and elemental
and system-level substitution. Where these efforts are best targeted
can be informed by the subsequent in-depth analyses.24

Russia – As a prominent geopolitical factor in global energy policy, Russia
plays a lesser but potentially significant role in the international REE equation.
The 1990s saw the role of REEs in Russian economic, military, and political
calculations began to increase with REE resources being estimated as ranging
from 18–22% of the world’s total and with existing and potential resources
and processing plants concentrated geographically in both European and
Asian Russia in locales as varied as the Irkutsk and Murmansk Oblasts and
Yakutia. During July 2013, the Russian Federation Government established
rules governing the formation of a Federal Reserve Fund for subsoil lots
containing minerals. February 2013 saw the Russian President issue a decree
outlining a strategy for enhancing mineral industry development in the Arctic
through 2020 despite Russian REE production falling from 2,600 metric tons
to 2,100 metric tons between 2009 and 2013. It is highly probable that
Russia will seek to use existing and potential REE resources to enhance its
strategic position and may seek to do so in collaboration with China.25
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Figure 11 Selected Map of Russian European REE Resource Sites

Source: European Journal of Mineralogy, 12(6), 2000: 1230.

United States – U.S. interest in documenting indigenous mineral resources
holdings predates the 1879 establishment of the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS). An 1833 report to Congress by the Secretary of War Lewis Cass
(1782–1866) called for the U.S. Government to document and map such
resources.26
Figure 12 Report from the Secretary of War

Source: ProQuest Congressional
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Subsequent decades have seen the U.S. place increasing emphasis on developing, conserving, and using indigenous mineral resources for a variety of
civilian and military applications. As military arsenals have become more
technologically advanced they have frequently required refined mineral
resources to make effective use of these weapons to achieve strategic and
national security objectives. While some of these mineral resources have been
available domestically, others have only been available from foreign suppliers
of sometimes questionable reliability. This has resulted in Congress enacting
legislation requiring multiple federal agencies to ensure the U.S. military and
civilian economy have dependable access to critically important strategic
resources such as REEs.27
Key U.S. Government Legislation
The past several decades have seen the U.S. Government enact numerous
statutes intended to ensure the U.S. has access to critical natural resources
and other materials for national security and domestic needs. The 1933 Buy
American Act sought to protect U.S. businesses and labor by restricting the
acquisition and end use of “non-domestic” products and construction materials. This statute has essentially defined these categories as unmanufactured
end products or construction materials defined or produced in the U.S. and
end products or construction materials manufactured in the U.S. provided
that their cost of components manufactured, mined, or produced in the U.S.
exceeds 50% of the cost of all components or the product is a commercially
available off-the-shelf item. End products or construction materials not
qualifying as domestic under these definitions are generally treated as foreign,
offers supplying foreign end products or construction materials or foreign
offers regardless of the suppliers’ nationality, and purchases of services are
generally not subject to the Buy American Act.28
This statute features five exceptions including:
1. Procuring domestic goods or using domestic construction materials is
inconsistent with the national interest.
2. Domestic end products or construction materials are unavailable.
3. The contracting officer determines the costs or domestic end products or
construction materials is unreasonable.
4. The agency is procuring information technology as a commercial item.
5. The goods are required specifically for commissary resale.29

The 1939 Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act was the first time
the term “critical material” appeared in U.S. statutory language. A key
provision of this statute’s intent declares:
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The Congress finds that the natural resources of the United States
in certain strategic and critical materials are deficient or insufficiently developed to supply the military, industrial, and essential
civilian needs of the United States for national defense. (b) It is the
purpose of this Act to provide for the acquisition and retention of
stocks of certain strategic and critical materials and to encourage
the conservation and development of sources of such materials
within the United States and thereby to decrease and to preclude,
when possible, a dangerous and costly dependence by the United
States upon foreign sources or a single point of failure for supplies
of such materials in times of national emergency. (c) The purpose
of the National Defense Stockpile is to serve the interest of
national defense only. The National Defense Stockpile is not to be
used for economic or budgetary purposes.30

Subsequent amendments to this statute in 1946, 1980, and 1984 represent the
foundation of U.S. national minerals and materials policy while providing
for the establishment of institutions such as the National Defense Stockpile
and National Critical Materials Council.31
1941 saw Congress enact a set of domestic source restrictions which would
eventually become known as the Berry Amendment and sought to require
that most DOD purchased items be grown, processed, and reused in the U.S.
This legislation would cause and continues causing considerable confusion
for DOD purchasers and lawyers in subsequent decades and apply to areas as
varied as strategic minerals and military clothing.32
The 1950 Defense Production Act (DPA) was enacted in response to
critical materials shortages encountered during World War II and the Korean
War’s onset. This statute expands presidential powers to give the President a
broad set of authorities to influence domestic industry to benefit national
defense. Broad examples of these expansive authorities include allowing the
President to require persons (including businesses and corporations) to prioritize and accept contracts for national defense related materials and services,
incentivizing the domestic industrial base to expand production and supply
of critical materials and goods via loans, loan guarantees, direct purchases,
and purchase commitments along with authority to purchase and install
equipment in private industrial facilities. Additional provisions of this statute
include the authority to establish voluntary agreements with private industry;
authority to block proposed or pending foreign corporate mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers threatening national security, and authority to employ
persons with requisite experience or ability and establish a pool of volunteer
industry executives who could be called to government service for national
defense purposes.33
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The 1988 Exon-Florio Amendment to this statute designates the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an interagency entity
chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, as the mechanism through which
the President acts to investigate and suspend corporate mergers and acquisitions or transactions which may be injurious to national security. In 1990,
the CFIUS ordered the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation to divest itself of Seattle’s NAMCO manufacturing and in 2005
CFIUS halted Chinese-owned Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s personal computer and laptop division.34
1973 saw congressional enactment of the Specialty Metals Clause which
saw the 1973 Defense Appropriations Act incorporate specialty metals into
the Berry Amendment. Specialty metals are used in components purchased
by DOD for aircraft weapons, equipment, and within integrated circuits,
wiring, and electrical components. Examples of specialty metals include
certain types of cobalt, nickel, steel, titanium and titanium alloys, and
zirconium and zirconium base alloy. These metals were separated from the
Berry Amendment in 2007. Numerous exceptions exist for requiring domestic
purchase of specialty metals including national security waivers, when they
are bought to support U.S. combat or contingency operations outside the U.S.,
when electrical components are involved, and when the Secretary of Defense
certifies in writing that such materials are needed for national security.35
The 1980 National Materials and Minerals Policy Research and Development Act sought to reiterate the critical importance of the U.S. having
sufficient supplies of critical materials for domestic economic and national
security needs stressing:
The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy of the United
States to promote an adequate and stable supply of materials
necessary to maintain national security, economic well-being and
industrial production, with appropriate attention to a long-term
balance between resource production, energy use, a healthy environment, natural resources conservation, and social needs. The
Congress further declares that implementation of this policy
requires that the President shall, through the Executive Office of
the President, coordinate the responsible departments and agencies
to, among other measures – (1) identify materials needs and assist
in the pursuit of measures that would assure the availability of
materials critical to commerce, the economy, and national security;
(2) establish a mechanism for the coordination and evaluation of
Federal materials programs, including those involving research and
development so as to complement related efforts by the private
sector as well as other domestic and international agencies and
organizations; (3) establish a long-range assessment capability
concerning materials demands, supply and needs, and provide for
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the policies and programs necessary to meet those needs; (4)
promote a vigorous, comprehensive, and coordinated program of
materials research and development consistent with the policies
and priorities set forth in the National Science and Technology
Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. 6601
et seq.); (5) promote cooperative research and development
programs with other nations for the equitable and frugal use of
materials and energy; (6) promote and encourage private enterprise
in the development of economically sound and stable domestic
materials industries; and (7) encourage Federal agencies to facilitate
availability and development of domestic resources to meet critical
materials needs.36

U.S. REE Policymaking Actors
Recent decades have seen a proliferation of U.S. Government agencies
become involved in REE policymaking activities which has made Washington
developing an effective REE national security and domestic economic policymaking essentially impossible.
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Strategic Materials division serves
as the U.S.’ leading agency for analyzing, planning, procuring, and managing
critical national security materials. DLA administers implementation and
evaluation of Strategic and Critical Materials policies set forth by the
National Defense Stockpile Manager and the Strategic and Critical Materials
Stockpiling Act. Strategic Materials uses its technical expertise and geopolitical material supply analysis to acquire, update, rotate, and dispose of
stockpile materials provided by the Annual Materials Plan.37
In its Fiscal Year 2016 annual report to Congress published in January
2017, DLA announced that it had initiated a Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) program to develop economic methods for recycling REEs
from waste and scrap streams and that the total inventory market value of the
National Defense Stockpile was $1.15 billion on September 30, 2016.38 This
agency’s FY 2017 Annual Materials Plan from October 1, 2016–September
30, 2017 includes the following potential sales:
Material
Chromium, Ferro
Chromium, Metal
Manganese, Ferro
Platinum
Tungsten Metal, Scrap
Tungsten Ores and Concentrates
Zinc

Unit
ST
ST
ST
TR OZ
LB
LB W
ST
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Ceiling Quantity
23,500
200
50,000
8,380
190
3,000,000
7,993.39

DLA’s potential upgrades and disposal plans for FY 2017 include:
Material
Beryllium Metal
Germanium
Manganese, Metallurgical Grade
Nickel Based Alloys
Platinum-Iridium
Tantalum Carbide Powder
Tin
Titanium Based Alloys
Tungsten Metal Powder

Unit
ST
Kg
SDT
LB
TrOz
LB Ta
MT
MT
LB W

Ceiling Quantity
2
5,000
322,025
150,000
489
3,777
804
75,000
77,433.40

In FY 2017 DOD’s potential acquisitions of strategic materials were:
Material
Boron Carbide
Carbon Fibers (High Strength)
CZT (Cadmium Zinc Tellurium)
Dysprosium Metal
Europium
Ferro-niobium
Germanium Metal
Lithium Cobalt Oxide (LCO)
Lithium Nickel Cobalt Aluminum
Oxide (LNCAO)
Mesocarbon Microbeads (MCMB)
Silicon Carbide Fibers
Tantalum
TATB (TriaminoTrinitrobenzeneO
Tungsten-3 Rhenium Metal
Yttrium Oxide

Unit
MT
MT
Cm2
MT
MT
MT
KG
KG
KG

Ceiling Quantity
1,000
72
32,000
0.5
18
209
1,000
600
2,160

KG
LB
Lb Ta
LB

15,552
875
33,990
148,000

KG
MT

5,000
10.41

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base
Policy (MIBP) serves as the principal advisor to the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for:
• DOD policies for maintaining the defense U.S. industrial base
• Industrial base related budget matters
• Anticipating and closing gaps in manufacturing capabilities or defense
systems
• Assessing impacts relating to mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures
• Monitoring and assessing the impact of foreign investments in the U.S.
• Executing legal authorities under 10 USC 2501 and 2505.42
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MIBP program areas include Advanced Manufacturing Capabilities covering
DPA Title III, manufacturing technology, and manufacturing resilience and
assurance; Industrial Base programs covering industrial base assessments,
fragility and criticality methodology, mergers and acquisitions under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and the Defense Priorities and Allocations System;
Global Markets and Investments including the Treasury Department’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), international
industrial base collaboration, and global market trends and non-notified
CFIUS cases; business intelligence and analytics incorporating adaptive
learning, data and text mining, predictive modeling, visibility, risk identification and management, efficient processes, and descriptive analysis; and
Industry Outreach including industry and association engagement, science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) oriented industrial capabilities, and the MD5 National Security Technology Accelerator striving to
promote civil-military industrial collaboration and venture creation by human
centered networks to enhance DOD workforce development.43
MIPB’s 2017 Industrial Base Report noted that DOD had made an initial
REE report to Congress in 2011. A March 2012 DOD report on REEs
stressed that DOD used REEs in multiple defense applications while asserting that DOD remained committed to pursuing a tripartite approach to REE
access including supply diversification, pursuing substitutes, and focusing on
waste reclamation as part of larger U.S. Government recycling efforts. This
document also contended DOD was committed to supply chain monitoring,
preparing possible contingency plans to ensure REE availability, and implementing such plans as appropriate.44
The newest version of this report stressed that subsequent speculation
about future REE shortages produced speculation based rapid price increases
and demand. These price increases saw global demand rapidly decrease
eventually producing a countervailing reaction of supplies increasing and REE
prices collapsing. The 2017 report noted remaining gaps in the REE domestic
supply chain and the 2015 closing of the U.S. only active REE mining
operation (Molycorp) in California, and stressed that the U.S. has limited
capabilities and capacities to produce value-added rare earth containing
minerals (e.g. separated oxides, metal, alloy and magnet materials) due to
unfavorable market conditions and the absence of a U.S. competitive advantage. Despite this gloomy assessment, MIBP makes the following delusional
assertion “that the supply of rare earth materials for U.S. defense is not
presently disrupted and future shortfalls are currently not anticipated.”45
A third DOD entity involved in REE policymaking is the Strategic
Materials Protection Board (SMPB). Established in 2006 by Public Law
109–364, this organization is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy with additional
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members including DLA’s Strategic Materials Administrator, and designees
by the Assistant Secretary of each armed service branch for acquisition,
research, and technology. SMPB board responsibilities include meeting at
least one every two years with additional responsibilities encompassing:
1. Determining the need to provide a long term secure supply of materials
designated as critical to national security to ensure that national defense
needs are met;
2. Analyzing the risk associated with each material designated as critical to
national security and the effect on national defense that the nonavailability
of such material would have;
3. Recommending a strategy to the Secretary to ensure a secure supply of
materials designated as critical to national security;
4. Recommending such other strategies to the Secretary as the Board
considers appropriate to strengthen the industrial base with respect to
materials critical to national security; and
5. Publishing not less frequently than once every two years in the Federal
Register recommendations regarding materials critical to national security,
including a list of specialty metals, if any, recommended for addition to, or
removal from, the definition of “specialty metal” for purposes of section
2533b of this title. 46
Despite these lofty objectives, SMPB is a barely functioning organization.
The only Federal Register documentation of its activities were listed in this
publication on November 8, 2007, July 21, 2008, February 23, 2009, and
July 29, 2009.47
U.S. Government REE research also occurs in the Department of Energy’s
National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL). Aspects of NETL research
include separating and recovering REEs from coal and coal by-products with
a projected goal of achieving 90–99.99% high-purity, salable, individual rare
earth metal oxides by 2020. Examples of these projects include NETL partnering with Physical Sciences, Inc., to produce High Yield and Economic
Production of REEs from Coal Ash, collaborating with the University of
Kentucky Research Foundation to extract REEs from coal and coal byproducts using advanced separation technologies, partnering with the University of North Dakota to extract REEs from coal-related feedstocks, and
collaborating with West Virginia University to recover REEs from coal mine
drainage. NETL has awarded contracts worth over $46 million on REErelated research for 2017.48
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U.S. Government Assessments of REE Policymaking
The U.S. Government’s REE policymaking programs are widely dispersed
and have been criticized by many U.S. government policy analyses. A July
3, 2014 by DOD’s Office of Inspector General (DODIG) determined DOD
did not have a comprehensive or reliable process for assessing REE supply
and demand. DODIG also determined that DLA Strategic Materials Division
officials failed to ensure that its modeling and simulation contractors used:
REE supply forecasts considering market and environmental risks; complete
REE demand survey results; and verified economic consumption data to
forecast REE demand. Such deficiencies occurred because DLA Strategic
Materials Division personnel did not possess adequate verification and
validation procedures to ensure realistic supply and demand inputs and did
not require the contractor to use an accredited model forecast REE supply
and demand. Consequently, DOD may not have identified all REEs with
expected shortfalls, increasing the risks that such shortfalls would negatively
affect critical weapons systems production in the DIB and overall military
readiness.49
DODIG recommendations for rectifying these deficiencies include:
• Developing and implementing a verification and validation plan for REE
supply and demand forecasting inputs;
• Developing and implementing procedures to ensure that future shortfall
analyses compare DOD demand and supply for REEs under the same
scenarios;
• Developing and implementing procedures for obtaining DOE REE consumption data by leveraging Service acquisition executive participation and
other techniques as appropriate;
• Developing and implementing an accreditation plan for the forecasting
model’s intended use; and
• Ensuring that current and future contracts for models, simulations, and
associated data include verification, validation, and accreditation procedures
in the contract requirements.50
These DODIG criticisms of DOD REE policymaking were reiterated in a
February 2016 report by the congressional Government Accountability Office
(GAO). GAO determined that while DOD has identified certain materials as
critical, there was no department-wide approach for precisely defining
“critical” or “strategic.” This semantic ambiguity is reflected in the following statutory definitions of critical or REEs by four different DOD organizational entities involved in REE policymaking:
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Office of the
Under Secretary
of Defense for
Acquisition,
Technology, and
Logistics
Terms: Critical
rare earth
materials in
defense
applications
Statutory
Definitions (a)
The rare earth
material is
critical to the
production,
sustainment, or
operation of
significant U.S.
military
equipment, and
(b) The rare earth
material is
subject to
interruption of
supply, based on
actions or events
outside United
States
Government
control.

Strategic Materials
Protection Board

Manufacturing and
Industrial Base
Policy

Defense
Logistics
AgencyStrategic
Materials

Materials critical
to national
security.

Materials critical to
national security.

Strategic and
critical materials

(a) Upon which
the production or
sustainment of
military equipment
is dependent and

(a) Upon which the
production or
sustainment of
military equipment
is dependent and

(a) Would be
needed to supply
the military,
industrial, and
essential civilian
needs of the
United States
during a national
emergency and

(b) The supply of
which could be
restricted by
actions or events
outside United
States Government
control.

(d) The supply of
which could be
restricted by actions
or events outside
United States
Government control

(b) Are not
found or
produced in the
United States in
sufficient
quantities to
meet such
need.51

These DOD agencies take a fragmented approach to identifying critical REEs
with the yttrium being identified as critical by the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Defense Logistics Agency
but not by the Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy Report and these
same agencies identifying dysprosium as critical but not by the Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy report. These same agencies also identified
praseodymium, neodymium, europium, gadolinium, and erbium as being
critical but the Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy report did not.52
Varying perspectives and definitions of REEs occur across armed service
branches. A laser expert at Naval Surface Warfare-Crane mentions that the
rare earth component in certain defense lasers creates and focuses the light
beam. Army Program Executive Office for Ammunition personnel said rare
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earth magnets enable guided artillery ammunition to move in flight to their
target. Army Research Laboratory officials told GAO they could sharpen
their focus on specific rare earths if there was a DOD-wide list of REEs
critical to national security.53
Other deficiencies in DOD REE policy identified by GAO included:
• DOD identifying supply disruption risk in a limited manner and not proactively analyzing the impact of rare earths unavailability.
• DLA Strategic Materials estimating the risk of supply shortfalls using
national emergency scenarios limited to four year time frames and recommending materials to stockpiles.
• These estimates cover scenarios of four years in which the first year is
assumed to be a conflict period and years two through four are assumed to
be a recovery period.
• MIBP has identified some risks relating to ensuring secure rare earth
supplies but its mitigation strategy is reactive; and
• SMPB has not taken a broader approach to comprehensive addressing the
underlying risks of the unavailability of rare earths.54
GAO recommendations to DOD for resolving these problems include the
Secretary of Defense:
• Directing SMPB to designate which rare earth materials are critical to
national security and providing a common DOD understanding of these
materials and focusing resources.
• Directing SMPB to analyze the effect of unavailability of national security
critical rare earths and develop a strategy to ensure a secure supply for those
designated critical to national security.
• Directing MIBP to define reliable sources and secure supply for rare earths
in measurable terms and provide metrics of its actions to better ensure continued availability.55
U.S. Rare Earth Element Reserves and Industry Developments
U.S. REE reserves are scattered at many locations across the U.S. They were
not mined domestically in 2016. The Mountain Pass, CA, site has been the
primary center of U.S. REE mining with its peak period being between the
mid-1960s through the 1980s. By 2000, nearly all U.S. REEs were imported,
primarily from China. Chinese oversupply, lower cost production, various
environmental problems, including a pipeline spill carrying contaminated
water, and regulatory problems resulted in Molycorp’s initial production
cessation in 2002. Under new ownership in 2008, Molycorp resumed production in 2008 and attempts were made to improve environmental practices.
However, these owners have experienced repeated financial problems influ74

enced, in part, by Chinese export practices. During 2016 the estimated value
of REE compounds and materials imported by the U.S. was $120 million as
compared to $160 million in imports in 2015. Distribution of U.S. rare earths
by end use is:
Catalysts
Metallurgical Applications and Alloys
Ceramics and Glass
Polishing
Other

55%
15%
10%
10%
10%.56

Figure 13 U.S. REE Reserve Sites

Source: USGS

U.S. import sources for REEs between 2012 and 2015 included China
72%; Estonia 7%; France 5%; Japan 5%; and other countries 11%. Imports
of compounds and metals from these non-Chinese countries are derived from
mineral concentrates produced in China and elsewhere. Ad valorem tariffs
paid by the U.S. for REE imports are free for lanthanum oxides and other
oxides, and range from 3.7% for lanthanum carbonates, other carbonates, and
other REE compounds; 5% for scandium and yttrium whether or not mixed
or intermixed; 5.5% for cerium compounds such as oxides; and 5.9% for
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ferrocerium and other pyrophoric allies. REE recycling occurs in limited
quantities from batteries, permanent magnets, and fluorescent lamps.57
DLA’s Annual Materials Plan for FY 2016 included a ceiling acquisition
of 0.5 tons of dysprosium metal and 10 tons of yttrium oxide. DLA acquired
8.8 tons of yttrium oxide during this year. Exploration and development efforts
of REE projects within the U.S. occurring in 2017 included Bear Lodge,
WY; Bokan Mountain, AK; Diamond Creek, ID; Elk Creek, NE; La Paz,
AZ; Lemhi Pass-ID-MT, Pea Ridge, MO; Round Top, TX, and Thor, NV.
Estimated U.S. REE reserves are 1,400,000 tons.58
Declining mineral prices and unsustainable debt forced Molycorp, Inc.,
the owner of the Mountain Pass, CA, REE mine, to file for bankruptcy in
June 2015.
During June 2016, an investor group with alleged ties to the Chinese
Government purchased Molycorp raising the possibility that CFIUS would
intervene to stop the sale on national security grounds. The case remains
under litigation in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Delaware District.
During July 2017, American Elements Corp. Chief Executive Officer
Michael Silver publicly advocated to former Trump Administration officials
Steve Bannon, Sebastian Gorka, and Reince Preibus that the U.S. should
nationalize Molycorp’s Mountain Pass mine on national security grounds.59
Specific U.S. Weapons Systems using REEs
REEs have become increasingly important to a growing number of U.S.
defense applications. General REE defense applications include precisionguided missiles, smart bombs, and aircraft. Additional military relevant REE
applications include:
• Smaller and lighter weapons systems magnets;
• Fin actuators in missile guidance and control systems, controlling the
direction of the missile;
• Disk drive motors installed in aircraft, tanks, missile systems, and command and control centers;
• Lasers for enemy mine detection, interrogators, underwater mines, and
countermeasures;
• Satellite communications, radar, and sonar on submarines and surface
ships; and
• Optical equipment and speakers.60
The following three charts provide specific examples of REE military applications.
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Figure 14 Rare Earth Elements in Guidance and Control Systems

Figure 15 Rare Earth Elements in Defense Electronic Warfare

Figure 16 Rare Earth Elements in Targeting and Weapon Systems

Source: Congressional Research Service
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Recent Congressional REE Legislation
Recent Congressional sessions have regularly seen legislation proposed to
address the strategic importance of REE and rectify the U.S. dependence on
these materials from unreliable foreign sources. On November 16, 2011, Rep.
Paul Ryan (R-WI) introduced H.R. 3449 requiring DOD to develop a defense
supply chain and industrial base strategy to secure the U.S. supply chain and
industrial base sectors the Secretary of Defense considers critical to U.S.
national security. H.R. 4402, the National Strategic and Critical Materials
Protection Act of 2012 passed the House on July 12, 2012, and was referred
to the Senate four days later. It would have required both the Secretaries of
the Interior and Agriculture to more efficiently develop domestic mineral
and materials sources of strategic and critical importance to U.S. economic
and national security, and manufacturing competitiveness.61
On March 26, 2015, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
Chair Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) introduced S. 883 The American Mineral
Security Act of 2015. This proposed legislation would have required the
USGS to consult with other federal agencies and invite public comment on a
draft methodology for determining which minerals qualify as critical and
subject to potential supply restrictions stemming from foreign political risk,
abrupt demand growth, military conflict, violent unrest, anti-competitive or
protectionist behaviors, and are important in energy technology, defense,
currency, agriculture, consumer electronics and health related applications.
A detailed hearing was held on this legislation by this committee on May 12,
2015, but no further action was taken on this legislation during the 114 th
Congress in 2015–2016.62
REE-related congressional legislation introduced during 2017 includes
H.R. 1407 Materials Essential to American Leadership and Security Act by
Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) calling for the U.S. to develop a domestic industrial base for producing strategic and critical materials, divesting the U.S.
from dependence on critical foreign-produced strategic and critical materials,
and creating a fund using 1% of internal programmatic administrative costs
of major aircraft and missile systems to promote investment in domestic
production of critical and strategic materials; and H.R. 2053 Mining School
Enhancement Act by Rep. Martha McSally (R-AZ) et al. calling for amending the 1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act by enhancing
financial support for mining engineering programs at U.S. educational institutions by reducing dependence on foreign energy supplies, enhancing the
competitiveness of U.S. energy technology exports, and augmenting “the
extraction or processing of coinciding mineralization, including rare earth
elements, within coal, coal processing byproduct, overburden or coal residue.”63
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On October 12, 2017, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Charles Grassley
(R-IA) wrote letters to various cabinet department heads, following up on
June 30, 2015, letters to CFIUS agency leaders expressing concern about
acquisition of U.S.-based Uranium One by the Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ)
subsidiary of the Russian state energy company Rosatom. This purchase gave
the Russian Government 20% of U.S. uranium production capacity which
Grassley’s letter expressed concern with while also noting that Uranium One
Chair Ian Telfer had made donations of over $1 million to the Clinton
Foundation. Grassley’s letter to these CFIUS agency leaders requested that
respondents answer the following questions and requests by October 26, 2017:
• List the dates of each CFIUS meeting involving the Uranium One/Rosatom
transaction, attendees by agency, and all relevant transcripts and communications.
• Whether agency personnel assigned to this transaction knew of ongoing
criminal and intelligence investigation into senior managers of Rosatom and
Tenex and Tenam before CFIUS’ October 2010 approval of the Uranium One
transaction?
• Provide a copy of the analysis that articulated the risk and vulnerabilities
presented by the transaction and any mitigation terms considered.
• Provide a copy of all records related to the presentation provided by
Uranium One/Rosatom to CFIUS staffers prior to filing a formal notice on
August 4, 2010.
• Provide a copy of your agency’s official confirmation to Treasury that the
transaction did not raise any unresolved national security concerns.
• Provide all records relating to your agency’s determination that the Uranium
One/Rosatom transaction did not raise any unresolved national security
concerns.
• Provide all records relating to communications with respect to Secretary
Clinton and donations to the Clinton Foundation by parties interested in the
Uranium One/Rosatom transaction.64
Trump Administration Policy Actions
The Trump Administration’s opening months have seen some tentative
evidence that it may take a more serious geopolitical approach to REEs and
other strategic materials critical to U.S. national security. Executive Order
13788 Buy American and Hire American signed on April 18, 2017, required
executive branch U.S. agencies to privilege purchasing American products
including those “produced in the United States such as all stages of iron,
steel, and manufactured goods from the initial melting stage through the
application of coatings occurring in the U.S. It also called for federal agencies
to “scrupulously, monitor, enforce, and comply with Buy American Laws.”
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A June 20, 2017, memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics to various DOD and
armed services acquisition authorities stressed that DODIG audits of compliance with the Berry Amendment and Buy American Act had found
numerous contracts where these statutes should have been included in contracts, but were not such as a July 7, 2017, DODIG report finding that DLA
had only complied Berry Amendment provisions in 13 of 32 contracts
reviewed with the non-compliant 19 contracts totaling $453.2 million.65
On July 21, 2017 President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13806
“Strengthening Defense Industrial Base & Supply Chain Security.” This
document called for the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Interior, Labor,
Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services, in consultation with
the Directors of Office of Management and Budget, National Intelligence,
the National Security Advisor, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy,
Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, and other relevant
policymakers to prepare a report within 270 days (by April 17, 2018)
containing classified and unclassified assessments of the U.S. manufacturing
capacity, defense industrial base, and supply chain resiliency.
Specific contents of this report include:
• Identifying military and civilian material, raw materials, other goods
essential to national security;
• Identifying manufacturing capabilities essential to producing these goods
including emerging capabilities;
• Identifying defense, intelligence, homeland, economic, natural, geopolitical,
or other contingencies capable of disrupting, straining, compromising, or
eliminating supply chains of these goods;
• Assessing the resilience and capacity of U.S. manufacturing and defense
industrial base and supply chains to support national security needs including
current domestic education and manufacturing workforce skills, exclusive or
dominant supply of goods or components by or through nations likely to
become unfriendly or unstable; and the availability of substitutes or alternative
sources of these goods;
• Identifying the causes of any aspect of the defense industrial base or
national-security-related supply chains assessed as deficient; and
• Recommending legislative, policy, and regulatory changes by the President
or other agency heads, based on a reasoned assessment that the benefits of
such changes outweigh costs, to disruptions to U.S. national security supply
chains and strengthen the U.S. manufacturing capacity and defense industrial
base resiliency.66
The September 5, 2017, Federal Register saw the Commerce Department’s
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) seek public comment by October 5,
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2017, on the potential market impact of the proposed FY 2019 National
Defense Stockpile Annual Materials Plan. This plan is compiled by the Commerce and State Department co-chaired Domestic Stockpile Market Impact
Committee on the projected defense and foreign economic effects of all
acquisitions, conversions, and disposals involving the stockpile and related
material research and development projects as stipulated by the 1979
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Revision Act of 1979.67
In addition to being chaired by Commerce and State, the Domestic Stockpile Market Impact Committee includes from representatives from Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and Treasury Departments and
portions of the proposed FY 2019 Materials Plan calls for potentially
disposing of 6 tons of beryllium metal and 190 pounds of tantalum scrap; the
potential acquisition of 0.5 metric tons of dysprosium, 416 metric tons of
REEs, and 100 metric tons of rare earth magnet feedstock; potential conversions (upgrading, rotating, and reprocessing) of 72 metric tons of dysprosium
and 416 metric tons of rare earth elements; and the potential recovery from
government sources of 25 metric tons of lithium ion precursors, 100 metric
tons of rare earth elements-magnets, and 10 metric tons of tantalum.68
On September 13, 2017, Trump issued an administrative order prohibiting Chinese acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation citing section
721 of the 1950 DPA that Canyon Bridge Acquisition Company and HongKong based Yitai and its parent company China Venture Capital Fund Corporation Limited could threaten U.S. national security by exercising control
over Lattice. This order directed the purchasers and Lattice to permanently
abandon this transaction within 30 days unless CFIUS extends abandoning
this order up to 90 days and requires the Purchasers and Lattice to inform
CFIUS in writing that the proposed transaction has been abandoned with the
Attorney General receiving authority to enforce this order.69
Recommendations
Multiple decades of U.S. Government policymaking on strategic materials,
including REEs, have created a policymaking structure of labyrinthine complexity producing bureaucratic sclerosis at a time when the U.S.’ economy
and defense weapons systems have become increasingly dependent on REEs
requiring agile response capabilities to counter potential supply disruptions.
There are several steps the U.S. Government should consider taking to enhance domestic REE development and lessen national security supply chain
disruptions.
An initial critical step is expediting the permitting process for approving
new mines. The U.S. has one of the longest global mining permitting processes often requiring nearly ten years to complete depending on project com81

plexity. This is expensive from the perspectives of industry and regulators,
creates uncertain outcomes, discourages investment in U.S. mining, and contributes to offshoring of mining and manufacturing and increased U.S. import
dependency. Testifying before a House Natural Resources Committee Subcommittee on October 10, 2013, West Virginia Coal Association Senior Vice
President and Chair Chris R. Hamilton stressed that nearly 1/3 of U.S. coal
mines operating in 2008 had closed by 2013 impacting both surface and
underground mines. Such actions have also affected the U.S. critical minerals
industry with some laws providing opportunities to delay, stop, and require
major modifications making projects become economically unfeasible due to
the risk of litigation. Voluminous federal mining regulations covering three
volumes and exceeding 2,200 pages in Title 30 of the 2017 Code of Federal
Regulations already govern U.S. mining activity sufficiently ensuring mineral
extraction industries comply with environmental regulations.70
The U.S. should also seriously consider nationalizing indigenous REE
reserves and mines to prevent possible takeover by unreliable and unfriendly
foreign suppliers. This would be a controversial step that would go against
the traditional free market leanings of a Republican presidential administration
and Congress. The Heritage Foundation has contended that the U.S. should
cheaply import REEs, that the U.S. should not subsidize technologies the
private sector won’t invest in, and that the federal government should open
access to REEs in states where they are known to exist and establish sufficient regulatory frameworks proving companies with the certainty needed
to extract REEs. China’s temporary 2010 embargo on REE exports casts
doubt on the notion that the U.S. can consistently reply on a dependable REE
supply chain from non-allied countries.71
Another problematic precedent to government nationalization of a major
industry is provided by the Truman Administration’s attempted takeover of
the U.S. steel industry during the Korean War. This action was protested by
the steel industry and resulted in the 1952 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer that the President did not have the
inherent authority to seize private property without specifically enumerated
authority in Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution or congressionally confirmed
legal authority.72
Potential U.S. tax reform legislation during the Trump Administration
should also consider tax incentives to the U.S. mineral resources industry to
facilitate exploration and develop of national REE resources. Consequently,
the Trump Administration’s review of the U.S. defense industrial base and
supply chain capacity mandated by EO 13866 should also seriously consider
whether nationalizing REE resources is an essential national security objective
given the increasing use of REEs in U.S. weapons systems and civilian
technological applications and be prepared to defend this in court.
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The U.S. should also require the military and defense industry to take all
steps necessary to acquire REEs from U.S. companies and from companies
from defense treaty allied countries; the U.S. should take appropriate administrative and regulatory action to require CFIUS to prohibit non-defense treaty
aligned foreign companies or countries from acquiring U.S. REE industries;
Congress should explicitly link DLA and MIBP budget appropriations to how
effectively they strengthen U.S. defense access to REEs; Congress should
legislate that only one DOD agency have responsibility for rare earth and
strategic minerals policymaking and consider dissolving the SMPB due to its
inactivity; Congress should restrict jurisdiction over defense REE programs
to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees due to the increasing
criticality of these programs to U.S. national security; and Congress should
continue providing financial incentives to promote REE education, research,
and development to U.S. university and corporate education programs.
Conclusion
REE’s have become critically important to U.S. economic development and
national security. A 2014 assessment by the National Center for Policy
Analysis maintains REEs support more than $298 billion in revenue from
downstream economic activity, 535,000 U.S. jobs, and over $33 billion in
payrolls.73 Relying on unreliable and even hostile foreign suppliers of REEs
such as Afghanistan, China, and others is geopolitical folly of the highest
order! The U.S. must ensure that it provides effective regulatory, research
and development, and tax incentives to its REE industry to ensure it can
meet continually increasing economic and national security needs for REEs
and structure government acquisition of these resources so they only come
from U.S. companies or from companies or governments with whom the
U.S. has a defense treaty alliance.
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